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 THE RETURN OF SPENDING LIMITS: 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE AFTER LANDELL V. 
SORRELL 
Richard Briffault*
INTRODUCTION 
 
On August 18, 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit held that the First Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court 
in Buckley v. Valeo,1 does not preclude mandatory limitations on campaign 
expenditures.2  In Landell v. Sorrell,3 the court concluded that limitations 
imposed by the state of Vermont on candidate spending in state election 
campaigns are “supported by [the state’s] compelling interests in 
safeguarding Vermont’s democratic process from 1) the corruptive 
influence of excessive and unbridled fundraising and 2) the effect that 
perpetual fundraising has on the time of candidates and elected officials.”4  
To be sure, the court declined to uphold the Vermont limits and, instead, 
remanded the case to the district court for a determination of whether the 
challenged spending limits are the “least restrictive means” of “furthering 
the State’s compelling anti-corruption and time-protection interests.”5
Although path-breaking, Landell is not entirely unprecedented.  In recent 
years, several communities have sought to challenge Buckley by adopting 
  
Nevertheless, Landell  is potentially one of the most important decisions in 
the evolution of modern campaign finance law as it marks the first time 
since Buckley that a court has held that a candidate expenditure limitation 
can be constitutional. 
 
*Vice-Dean & Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia Law School; 
B.A., Columbia, 1974; J.D., Harvard, 1977. 
 1. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 2. Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2004), petition for reh’g en banc denied, No. 
00-915(L), 2005 WL 826151  (2d Cir. Feb. 11, 2005).  The order denying the rehearing en 
banc was filed on February 5, 2005, and amended on April 11, 2005, April 20, 2005, and 
May 11, 2005 to reflect dissenting and concurring opinions.  Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 97 (internal citation omitted). 
 5. Id. 
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spending limits for local6 or state judicial candidates.7  These restrictions 
were invalidated on the authority of Buckley, but a number of the judges 
who heard the challenges to these laws displayed some restiveness with 
Buckley’s rejection of spending limitations.8  So too, although the Supreme 
Court has for nearly three decades continued to adhere to Buckley, aspects 
of the Court’s recent campaign finance decisions suggest the Court might 
be open to rethinking Buckley’s premises.9  Landell could very well 
provide the Court with the opportunity to reconsider Buckley.10
The Landell opinion, while very significant, is also limited in several 
respects.  The Second Circuit’s suggestion that voluntary public funding 
with spending limits may be a less restrictive means of attaining the goals 
of spending limits is troubling, and threatens to pit these two 
complementary tenets of campaign finance reform against each other.  
Moreover, although Landell challenges Buckley’s conclusion concerning 
spending limits, it still works largely within Buckley’s basic conceptual 
framework.  As a result, the Second Circuit’s analysis does not reflect the 
full range of possible justifications for spending limitations. 
 
Part I of this Article will analyze the Landell decision and situate it in 
the evolving judicial debate over campaign finance regulation.  Part II will 
discuss the question, raised by the Second Circuit for the Landell district 
court on remand, whether spending limits are the least restrictive means of 
attaining the compelling interests relied on by the court. Part III will then 
examine those interests as well as other justifications for spending limits.  
As I will suggest, the constitutionality of spending limits in principle11
 
 6. See Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907 (6th Cir. 1998) (spending limitations 
on candidates for Cincinnati City Council); Homans v. City of Albuquerque, 160 F. Supp. 
2d 1266 (D.N.M. 2001) (spending limitations on candidates for Albuquerque city office). 
 
would rest on a stronger foundation if other important interests directly 
 7. See Suster v. Marshall, 149 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 1998) (spending limits adopted by the 
Ohio Supreme Court, as amendments to the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct, for judicial 
elections). 
 8. See infra Part I.B (discussing the Homans and Kruse decisions). 
 9. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 10. Indeed, there is evidence that the Vermont law at issue in Landell was adopted for 
that very purpose.  See Landell, 2005 WL 826151, at *12 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) 
(“Obviously, the Act was engineered to provide an opportunity for the Supreme Court to 
revisit existing law in this area.”) (citing a statement by Vermont Secretary of State Deborah 
L. Markowitz). 
 11. I emphasize that my argument supports spending limits in principle, not the specific 
spending limits adopted by Vermont.  As discussed infra at note 114, those limits are both 
quite low and apply to a broad range of expenditures.  Low limits can be in tension not only 
with the free speech values usually asserted in opposition to spending limits but also with 
the electoral competitiveness argument that supports spending limits.  See infra notes 201-
02 and accompanying text. 
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relevant to the financing of democratic elections, particularly electoral 
competitiveness and voter equality, were taken into account. 
I.  LANDELL AND THE EVOLVING JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION OF 
CANDIDATE EXPENDITURE LIMITATIONS 
A. Buckley v. Valeo 
Modern campaign finance doctrine begins with the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Buckley v. Valeo that campaign finance regulation directly 
implicates fundamental First Amendment freedoms of speech and 
association.12  In so doing, Buckley sharply distinguished between limits on  
contributions and limits on expenditures.13  The Court held that 
expenditures involve direct communications with the voters, and thus, 
expenditure ceilings “impose direct and substantial restraints on the 
quantity of political speech.”14  As a result, any restriction on expenditures 
must be subject to strict judicial scrutiny and narrowly tailored to promote 
a compelling state interest.15  By contrast, the Court found that a 
contribution does not entail an expression of political views; rather, it 
“serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, 
but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support.”16  
Although contributions fund the communications of candidates, “the 
transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by 
someone other than the contributor.”17  Thus, contribution restrictions do 
not trigger the same exacting judicial review as spending limits.  Moreover, 
the Court found that contribution restrictions advance the compelling 
government interests of preventing corruption and the appearance of 
corruption.18  As the Court noted, “[t]o the extent that large contributions 
are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential 
office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is 
undermined.”19
 
 12. 424 U.S. 1, 23 (1976). 
  Based on the lower speech value of campaign 
contributions and the compelling interest of preventing corruption and the 
 13. Id. at 20-21. 
 14. Id. at 39. 
 15. Id. at 14-20 (holding that restrictions on campaign expenditures are to be treated as 
restrictions on “the quantity and diversity of political speech” and, thus, subject to the 
“exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment”). 
 16. Id. at 21. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 26-29. 
 19. Id. at 26. 
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appearance of corruption, Buckley sustained the Federal Election Campaign 
Act (“FECA”) limits on donations by individuals and political committees 
to federal candidates and on aggregate annual donations by individuals for 
federal election purposes.20
In Buckley, however, the Court found that “[n]o governmental interest 
that has been suggested is sufficient to justify” FECA’s limitations on 
expenditures by federal candidates.
 
21  The Court considered three 
arguments for spending limits: 1) preventing corruption and the appearance 
of corruption; 2) promoting candidate equality; and 3) holding down the 
high and rising costs of campaigns.22  Although the Court found that the 
prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption were important 
government interests, it determined that FECA’s contribution limits and 
disclosure requirements already took care of the corruption problem.  The 
Court thus concluded that the goals of preventing corruption and the 
appearance of corruption could not justify the heavy burden on First 
Amendment rights posed by FECA’s expenditure limits.23  The Court also 
specifically rejected the argument that expenditure restrictions are 
necessary to reduce the incentive to circumvent contribution limits, finding 
instead that “[t]here is no indication that the substantial criminal penalties 
for violating the contribution ceilings combined with the political 
repercussions of such violations will be insufficient to police the 
contribution provisions.”24
With respect to candidate equality, the Court found it was not clear that 
spending limitations would promote equality.  Rather, such limits could 
operate “to handicap a candidate who lacked substantial name recognition 
or exposure of his views before the start of the campaign.”
 
25
 
 20. Id. at 23-38.  Later cases sustained lower limitations on donations to candidates in 
state elections, Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000), limitations on 
donations to political action committees, Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981), a 
ban on donations by corporations, FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003), and limitations 
on donations to and by political parties, McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
  More 
generally, the Court found that, with contribution limitations, different 
levels of spending by candidates posed little concern: “[T]he financial 
resources available to a candidate’s campaign, like the number of 
volunteers recruited, will normally vary with the size and intensity of the 
candidate’s support.  There is nothing invidious, improper, or unhealthy in 
permitting such funds to be spent to carry the candidate’s message to the 
 21. 424 U.S. at 55. 
 22. Id. at 45, 53-57.  
 23. Id. at 55. 
 24. Id. at 56. 
 25. Id. at 57. 
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electorate.”26
As for the third argument for spending limitsholding down campaign 
spending levelsthe Court held that there was simply no governmental 
interest in limiting the amount of money spent on election campaigns.
 
27
Buckley invalidated not only limitations on candidate spending but also 
FECA’s limits on so-called independent spending, that is, expenditures by 
individuals and groups, acting independently of any candidate, to support 
or oppose a candidate.
 
28  The Court held that the anti-corruption rationale 
could not justify these restrictions because  “[t]he absence of 
prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate . . . 
alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for 
improper commitments from the candidate.”29  Nor could these limits be 
justified by the “governmental interest in equalizing the relative ability of 
individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections” since the 
First Amendment precludes restricting the speech of some “to enhance the 
relative voice of others.”30
B. Recent Judicial Stirrings 
 
Although the contribution/expenditure dichotomy and strict judicial 
review of spending limits remain fundamental to the Supreme Court’s 
campaign finance jurisprudence,31 in recent years some lower federal 
courts have expressed discontent with Buckley’s apparent constitutional 
preclusion of spending limits.  These stirrings reflect grass-roots political 
resistance to Buckley and foreshadowed the Second Circuit’s ruling in 
Landell.  The beginnings of a new judicial debate over spending limits can 
be seen in Kruse v. City of Cincinnati32 and Homans v. City of 
Albuquerque.33
 
 26. Id. at 56. 
 
 27. See id. at 57. 
 28. See id. at 51-54. 
 29. Id. at 47. 
 30. Id. at 48-49.  Subsequently, the Court invalidated independent expenditure 
restrictions in the context of a publicly funded presidential election, FEC v. Nat’l 
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985), and restrictions on the 
independent expenditures of political parties, Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. 
FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996). 
 31. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 134-35 (2003); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. 
Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387-88 (2000). 
 32. 142 F.3d 907 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 33. 217 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (D.N.M. 2002), aff’d, 366 F.3d 900 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. 
denied., 125 S. Ct. 625 (2004) [hereinafter Homans II]; 160 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (D.N.M. 
2001), rev’d, 264 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Homans I]. 
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(1) Kruse v. City of Cincinnati 
In 1995, the Cincinnati City Council adopted an ordinance imposing 
campaign expenditure limitations on candidates for the council.34  The 
action appears to have been motivated in part by a desire to challenge 
Buckley.35  The city contended that the spending limit was justified by 
Buckley’s concern with preventing corruption and the appearance of 
corruption.  It presented evidence that wealthy donors dominated the 
financing of city elections, and that the overwhelming majority of local 
residents believed that large contributors wielded undue influence over the 
local political system.36  The Sixth Circuit, however, held that Buckley 
“foreclose[d] . . . as a matter of law” the use of the anti-corruption 
argument to justify a spending limit.37  The court went on to find that, as a 
matter of fact, the city had failed to prove spending limits were strictly 
necessary to prevent corruption since the city had not imposed contribution 
limits prior to its adoption of spending limits.38  Thus, the Sixth Circuit 
held that the city had “no evidence that contribution limits are inadequate 
to prevent actual and perceived quid pro quo corruption.”39
The court also dismissed a new justification for spending 
limitsreducing the time burden that fundraising poses for officeholders 
and candidates.  Kruse found this was no more than a restatement of the 
argument, rejected in Buckley, that there is a compelling public interest in 
reducing campaign costs.
 
40  Finally, the court determined that arguments 
raised by the city that spending limits are necessary to enable candidates 
without access to wealth to participate in the electoral process, and to 
enable the voters to consider those candidates, were barred by Buckley’s 
rejection of equality rationales for expenditure limitations.41
One member of the Kruse panel, however, took issue with the dismissal 
of the time-protection argument, and also raised the possibility that 
 
 
 34. Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907, 909 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 35. See id. at 910 (noting that proponents of the spending limits believed the city should 
challenge Buckley). 
 36. Id. at 911. 
 37. Id. at 915.  The court specifically concluded that Buckley barred the argument that 
spending limits were necessary to eliminate the incentive to circumvent contribution limits.  
Id. 
 38. Id. at 916. 
 39. Id.  The court concluded that the city could not rely on the federal experience with 
contribution limits in national elections to “support its contention that they will inevitably 
prove inadequate at the local level.” Id.  The court ascribed federal election problems to the 
“‘soft-money’ loophole” in federal restrictions on contributions.  Id.  
 40. See id. at 916-17 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 (1976)). 
 41. Id. at 917-18. 
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spending limitations could be justified by “the interest in preserving faith in 
democracy.”42  In his concurrence, Judge Cohn found that officeholder and 
candidate time-protection and the prevention of “public cynicism” about 
democracy attributable to unlimited spending are important interests that 
are conceptually distinct from the concern about campaign costs dismissed 
in Buckley.43  Although Judge Cohn agreed with the majority that the city 
had “failed to develop a compelling factual record” and thus concurred in 
the result, he sought to leave an opening for future efforts to limit campaign 
spending by concluding that “Buckley . . . is not a broad pronouncement 
declaring all campaign expenditure limits unconstitutional.”44
[i]t may be possible to develop a factual record to establish that the 
interest in freeing officeholders from the pressures of fundraising so they 
can perform their duties, or the interest in preserving faith in our 
democracy, is compelling, and that campaign expenditure limits are a 
narrowly tailored means of serving such an interest.
  Rather, he 
suggested that 
45
(2) Homans v. City of Albuquerque 
 
Three years later, Judge Cohn’s suggestion was embraced by Judge 
Vazquez of the federal district court in New Mexico in a challenge to 
Albuquerque’s spending limits for municipal elections.46  Albuquerque had 
adopted spending limits in 1974 and, amazingly enough, despite Buckley 
those limits remained on the books and were apparently enforced through 
1995.47  The limits were temporarily enjoined in 1997, but restored and 
amended in 1999.48  When a mayoral candidate sought to enjoin their 
enforcement in the 2001 race, Judge Vazquez denied the plaintiff’s request 
for a preliminary injunction, concluding that the plaintiff had shown neither 
a likelihood of success on the merits nor that the public interest would 
benefit from an injunction.49
Rather, the court found on the record that for more than two decades the 
Albuquerque spending limits had promoted competitive elections, 
 
 
 42. Id. at 919 (Cohn, D.J., concurring). 
 43. Id. at 919-20. 
 44. Id. at 920. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Homans I, 160 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (D.N.M. 2001), rev’d, 264 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. 
2001). 
 47. See Homans II, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1200 (D.N.M. 2002), aff’d, 366 F.3d 900 
(10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied., 125 S. Ct. 625 (2004). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Homans I, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1273-74. 
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increased citizen confidence in government, led to increased voter turnout, 
reduced the role of large donors, created opportunities for lower-income 
and lower-middle-income candidates, and generally improved the quality 
of electoral campaigns without limiting the ability of candidates to 
campaign effectively.50  Based on that record, the court found the city had 
demonstrated its spending limits were necessary to promote the compelling 
governmental interest in “preserving the public faith in democracy, and 
reducing the appearance of corruption.”51  The district court also 
concluded, based on the voter turnout data, that circumstances had changed 
in the quarter-century since Buckley so that “it is clear today that the public 
perception of Albuquerque citizens is that unlimited spending infects the 
political process.”52  The court echoed Judge Cohn’s opinion in Kruse in 
citing the effect of the fundraising “arms race” in forcing candidates to 
“spend innumerable hours eliciting contributions rather than performing 
public duties or ascertaining the interests of those citizens unable to make 
large financial contributions.”53  The financial arms race, in turn, reinforced 
the public perception of special interest domination of elections.54  By 
ending the arms race and reducing the role of money in elections, the 
Albuquerque spending limit was narrowly tailored to advance a compelling 
government interest.55
Less than a week later, the Tenth Circuit reversed and held that the 
interests identified by the district court were “really no different than the 
interests deemed insufficient to justify expenditure limitations in Buckley” 
and granted a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the 
Albuquerque limits.
 
56
Subsequently, the district court conducted a full trial on the merits.  The 
court again found that unlimited campaign spending interfered with 
competitive elections by giving incumbents an advantage.  The court noted 
that all the mayors seeking reelection in Albuquerque since the adoption of 
spending limits had been defeated, compared with the eighty-eight percent 
reelection rate of incumbent mayors in other cities.
 
57
 
 50. See id. at 1268-70. 
  The court again 
found that turnout in municipal elections had been higher in Albuquerque 
under spending limits than in other cities without spending limits, and that 
 51. Id. at 1272. 
 52. See id. 
 53. Id. at 1273. 
 54. See id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Homans v. City of Albuquerque, 264 F.3d 1240, 1244-45 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 57. Homans II, 217 F. Supp. 2d  1197, 1200 (D.N.M. 2002), aff’d, 366 F.3d 900 (10th 
Cir. 2004), cert. denied., 125 S. Ct. 625 (2004). 
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Albuquerque voters considered their spending-limited elections to be less 
influenced by special interest money than federal elections, in which 
spending is not subject to limitation.58  Looking at federal election 
practices, the court found that it is easy for large donors to circumvent 
contribution limitations by bundling.59  Moreover, with unlimited 
spending, candidates are “under a great deal of pressure to engage in 
fundraising activities and to depend on the goodwill of their donors.”60  
The court again concluded that the local spending limit did not interfere 
with effective campaigning; indeed, five of the eight candidates, including 
the winner and the second- and third-place finishers in the non-limited 
2001 elections, spent less than the enjoined spending limit would have 
allowed.61  Ultimately, the district court determined, based on the Tenth 
Circuit’s interpretation of Buckley, that it was “constrained to find” that the 
city’s expenditure limits were unconstitutional.62
narrowly tailored to serve the compelling interests of deterring corruption 
and the appearance of corruption, promoting public confidence in 
government, permitting candidates and officeholders to spend less time 
fundraising and more time performing their duties as representatives and 
interacting with voters, increasing voter interest in and connection to the 
electoral system, and promoting an open and robust public debate by 
encouraging electoral competition.
  If the court had been free 
to apply the analysis it had used in initially denying the preliminary 
injunction, however, the limits would have been upheld as: 
63
In the final decision in the Homans saga,
 
64 a Tenth Circuit panel 
affirmed the district court, but split over whether Buckley was an 
insurmountable barrier to all spending limits, and whether time-protection 
and electoral competition are compelling justifications for such limits.  
Writing the “principal opinion”65
 
 58. Id. at 1201. 
 for the panel, Judge Lucero determined 
 59. See id. at 1202, 1205 n.2.  Bundling is a “manipulative contribution device[] . . . 
which enable[s] special interests to direct large quantities of money by way of individual 
contributions to particular candidates.”  Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 100 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 60. Homans II, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 1201. 
 61. Id. at 1203-04. 
 62. Id. at 1206. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Homans v. City of Albuquerque, 366 F.3d 900 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. 
Ct. 625 (2004) [hereinafter Homans III].. 
 65. Id. at 902; see id. at 914 n.1 (Tymkovich, J., concurring).  In the concurring opinion, 
joined by Judge O’Brien, Judge Tymkovich refers to the opinion of Judge Lucero as the 
“principal opinion” even though two of the three members of the panel did not join its 
interpretation of Buckley.  Id. 
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that Buckley was not a per se prohibition on spending limits.66  Rather, he 
concluded, Buckley resolved only the sufficiency of the arguments 
specifically addressed by the Supreme Courtanti-corruption, equalization 
of candidate resources, and limiting campaign costs“leav[ing] open the 
possibility that at least in some circumstances expenditure limits may 
withstand constitutional scrutiny.”67  He determined that time-protection 
was conceptually distinct from the cost-limitation argument rejected in 
Buckley and could be a compelling interest justifying spending limits.68  
Similarly, the state interest in promoting electoral competition was an 
“interest distinct from” the candidate resources equalization argument 
rejected in Buckley.69  Indeed, Judge Lucero determined that Buckley’s 
rejection of the anti-corruption and perception of corruption justifications 
for spending limits turned on the particular circumstances of that case.70
Ultimately, however, Judge Lucero, applying the strict scrutiny analysis 
he agreed Buckley requires for judicial review of campaign expenditure 
limitations, held that Albuquerque could not demonstrate that spending 
limits were necessary to meet the compelling government interests 
asserted.
  
Thus, it would be possible for a government to produce evidence that 
expenditure limits are necessary to prevent corruption. 
71  The city had failed to present evidence that bundling practices 
in Albuquerque actually circumvented contribution restrictions,  that there 
was undue special interest influence on government, or that spending limits 
actually promoted public confidence in government.72  The city had also 
failed to produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the time burden of 
fundraising was a “problem of constitutional proportions” in 
Albuquerque73
 
 66. Id. at 902. 
 or that spending limits actually improved electoral 
 67. Id. at 906, 906 n.7. 
 68. Id. at 911-13. 
 69. Id. at 913. 
 70. See id. at 907-08. 
 71. Id. at 913. 
 72. Id. at 908-11.  Judge Lucero specifically rejected the evidence that Albuquerque’s 
spending limits had increased turnout.  Id. at 909-10.  Albuquerque’s higher voting rate, 
compared with those of other cities, was apparently due to differences in the denominator: 
the Albuquerque figures were based on registered voters while the turnout rate for other 
cities was based on voting age population. Albuquerque turnout based on voting age 
population was comparable to that in other cities.  Id. at 910.  Similarly, the court discounted 
the significance of public opinion surveys that found Albuquerque residents had more 
confidence in the integrity of spending-limited local elections compared with un-limited 
federal elections. The difference was ascribed to the generally higher level of trust voters 
have in local government, regardless of spending limits.  Id. 
 73. Id. at 912. 
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competition.74
In his concurring opinion, Judge Tymkovich, joined by Judge O’Brien, 
agreed with Judge Lucero that Buckley “did not adopt a per se rule against 
campaign spending limits,”
 
75 thereby making the Tenth Circuit the first 
appellate court since Buckley was decided to hold that campaign spending 
limits could be constitutional.  But Judge Tymkovich emphatically rejected 
the arguments for spending limits considered by Judge Lucero.  Instead, his 
concurrence found that Buckley flatly precluded any justification of 
spending restrictions in terms of the government interest in reducing 
corruption.  In accord with the Sixth Circuit in Kruse, the concurrence 
further found the candidate time-protection argument to be subsumed in 
Buckley’s rejection of a government interest in controlling election costs.76  
Moreover, in an analysis foreshadowing the remand order in Landell, the 
concurrence suggested that, even if time-protection could be considered a 
distinct governmental interest, spending limits are not narrowly tailored to 
further that interest since the provision of public funding for 
candidatesor the imposition of higher contribution restrictionswould 
reduce the time necessary for fundraising with less burden on First 
Amendment rights.77  Finally, the concurrence again disagreed with the 
principal opinion, finding that Buckley’s rejection of equalization of 
candidate resources as a compelling argument took care of the asserted 
interest in electoral competition.78
Together, the Cincinnati and Albuquerque cases indicate some 
discontent in the lower federal courts with the foundations of Buckley.  The 
Tenth Circuit concluded that Buckley does not adopt a per se rule against 
spending limits, and judges on the Sixth Circuit and Tenth Circuit panels 
found that such concerns as protecting officeholder time, promoting 
electoral competition, vindicating popular faith in democracy, and even 
preventing corruption may be compelling interests that justify spending 
limits.  In addition, the New Mexico federal district court found that, at the 
very least, spending limits are consistent with effective challenges to 
incumbents, high voter turnout, and effective campaigning.  Of course, in 
both cases, the appellate courts invalidated the spending limitations.  But 
Kruse and Homans may be said to have set the stage for the Second 
Circuit’s determination in Landell that candidate spending limits can be 
 
 
 74. Id. at 913. 
 75. Id. at 915 (Tymkovich, J., concurring). 
 76. Id. at 917-18; accord Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907, 916-17 (6th Cir. 
1998). 
 77. Homans III, 366 F.3d at 919 (Tymkovich, J., concurring). 
 78. Id. at 919-20. 
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constitutional. 
C. Landell v. Sorrell 
The Vermont Campaign Finance Act of 1997 (“Act”) consists of an 
extensive package of  campaign finance regulations, including restrictions 
on contributions to candidates for state office, partial public funding for 
candidates for governor, and mandatory expenditure restrictions on all 
candidates for state office.79  In the inevitable constitutional challenge that 
followed enactment, the federal district court found the Act was the end-
product of a process that included extensive legislative deliberation which 
resulted in legislative findings that rising spending levels denied some 
Vermonters the opportunity to run for office, required candidates to devote 
“inordinate amounts of time raising campaign funds,” and reduced “public 
involvement and confidence in the electoral process.”80  After a ten-day 
bench trial, the district court agreed with the state that the evidence 
“overwhelmingly demonstrated that the Vermont public is suspicious about 
the effect of big-money influence over politics”81 and that unlimited 
campaign spending erodes public confidence in government and results in 
both actual and perceived influence by large contributors on legislators.82  
The court further found that “the need to solicit money from large donors at 
times turns legislators away from their official duties”83  The court 
determined that the specific limits adopted by Vermont would not interfere 
with effective campaigning.84
 
 79. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2801-2883 (2004). 
  In addition, relying in part on the reasoning 
in the separate opinion of Judge Cohn in Kruse, the court found that 
spending limits are an “effective response to certain compelling 
 80. Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d 459, 468 (D. Vt. 2000). 
 81. Id. at 468. 
 82. Id. at 469-70. 
 83. Id. at 468. 
 84. Id. at 472.  Under the Act, candidates for state representative or local offices may 
not accept more than $200 from any single source; state senate or county office candidates 
are limited to single contributions of $300 each; governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of 
state, state treasurer, auditor of accounts, or attorney general candidates may not accept 
single contributions over $400; and political committees are limited to single source 
contributions of $2000 or less.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 § 2805.  Campaign expenditures are 
also limited.  For example, candidates for governor cannot spend more than $300,000 in any 
two-year general election cycle, and lieutenant governor candidate expenditures are limited 
to $100,000.  Id. at § 2805(a).  In finding that these limits did not hinder effective 
campaigning in Vermont, the District Court noted that “[i]n Vermont legislative races, low-
cost [campaigning] methods . . . are standard and even expected by the voters” and that 
“Vermont ranks 49th out of the 50 states in campaign spending.”  Landell, 118 F. Supp. 2d 
at 472. 
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governmental interests not addressed in Buckley,” including protecting 
officeholders’ abilities to attend to their official duties, preserving faith in 
democracy, and protecting access to the political arena.85  The court found 
“the state proved that each of these concerns exist, and that Vermont’s 
expenditures limits address them.”86  The district court ultimately 
concluded, however, that Buckley v. Valeo required that the spending limits 
be declared unconstitutional.87
On appeal, the Second Circuit determined it was not so constrained by 
Buckley.  In both an initial opinion which was issued in August 2002
 
88 and 
withdrawn just two months later89 while a petition for rehearing en banc 
was pending, and the amended opinion finally issued in August 2004,90 the 
Second Circuit panel determined that Buckley “did not rule campaign 
expenditure limits to be per se unconstitutional, but left the door ajar for 
narrowly tailored spending limits that secure clearly identified and 
appropriately documented compelling governmental interests.”91  Like 
Judge Lucero in Homans, the court found that both the “corruptive 
influence” of unlimited spending and “the effect the perpetual fundraising 
has on the time of candidates and elected officials” were compelling 
interests that could justify expenditure limitations.92  Unlike the Tenth 
Circuit, however, the Landell panel, in an opinion by Judge Straub joined 
by Judge Pooler, found that unlimited spending posed dangers of 
corruption and the appearance of corruption that were not adequately 
addressed by contribution limits.93
Acknowledging that Buckley had concluded that the corruption danger 
could be effectively met by contribution limits, so that the burden on 
 
 
 85. Landell, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 482-83 (citing Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907, 
920 (6th Cir. 1998) (Cohn, J., concurring); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. 
FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 649-50 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
 86. Id. at 483. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Landell v. Vt. Pub. Interest Research Group, 300 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2002), 
withdrawn, Landell v. Sorrell, No. 00-9159(L), 2002 WL 31268493, at *1 (2d Cir. Oct. 3, 
2002). 
 89. Landell, 2002 WL 31268493, at *1. 
 90. See Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 2004).  The initial Second Circuit 
opinion in Landell was assessed in Nathan Huff, Note, Landell v. Sorrell: Lessons Learned 
from Vermont’s Pending Challenge to Buckley v. Valeo, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 239 (2003).  
See also John T. Cooke, Making the Case for Campaign Finance: One Theory Explaining 
the Withdrawal of Landell v. Sorrell, 27 VT. L. REV. 685, 685, 691-94 (2003) (noting that 
the original decision directly challenged Buckley v. Valeo and discussing the majority and 
dissenting opinions). 
 91. Landell, 382 F.3d at 97. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See id. at 108, 115-19. 
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speech resulting from spending limits was not strictly necessary for 
preventing corruption, Landell found “the reality of campaign financing in 
Vermont”  demonstrated that contribution limits alone were inadequate to 
deal with the danger that state officials would be too compliant with the 
wishes of large contributors.94  In particular, the court noted that due to the 
practice of “bundling” small contributions together, interest groups could 
make their influence felt despite the limits on individual donations.95  With 
unlimited spending, the resulting “arms race mentality has made candidates 
beholden to financial constituencies that contribute to them.”96  Due to 
Buckley’s holding concerning the insufficiency of the anti-corruption 
justification, the Second Circuit panel also relied on a second basis for 
spending limitsprotecting the time of candidates and officeholders from 
the burdens of fundraising.  The court determined that this was a matter of 
compelling government concern, which Buckley had not considered in its 
analysis of expenditure limitations.97  The court found that the state of 
Vermont had proven that “the pressure to raise large sums of money” 
forces candidates to devote extra time to contributors, thus, “drastically 
reduc[ing] opportunities that candidates have to meet with non-contributing 
citizens.”98  Drawing the anti-corruption and time protection arguments 
together into a general concern for the “integrity of the electoral process,”99 
the court concluded that the “basic democratic requirements” of 
officeholder “accessibility” and “accountability” to constituents are 
“imperiled when the time of public officials is dominated by those who pay 
for such access with campaign contributions.”100
Landell’s reliance on the anti-corruption justification is certainly in 
tension with Buckley’s determination that spending limits are not necessary 
to prevent corruption because contribution limits can vindicate anti-
corruption values while placing less of a burden on campaign speech.  As 
Landell found, however, as long as there is no limit on the potential costs 
of a campaign, candidates (other than those who are personally wealthy) 
will still need to collect massive amounts of contributions.
 
101
 
 94. Id. at 118-19. 
 Although 
individual contributions are limited, intermediary organizations can 
effectively “bundle” together the donations of individuals or associations 
 95. Id. at 118. 
 96. Id. at 119. 
 97. Id. at 120-21, 124. 
 98. Id. at 122. 
 99. Id. at 124 n.18 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 401 (2000) 
(Breyer, J., concurring)). 
 100. Id. at 125. 
 101. Id. at 121-22. 
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with shared economic or ideological interests so that these groups continue 
to play a key role in financing campaigns.  Indeed, the combined effect of 
limited contributions and unlimited spending is a powerful stimulus to the 
activities of such campaign intermediaries, as their work benefits both 
donors and candidates alike.102  As a result, even with low contribution 
limits, people affiliated with a particular group, interest, or sector can 
together make large contributions to a candidate, with the candidate aware 
of, and likely grateful for, their efforts.103
Landell’s time-protection argument was not directly addressed by the 
Supreme Court in its analysis of spending limits so the Second Circuit’s 
analysis on this point is less of a direct challenge to Buckley than its 
analysis of the anti-corruption justification.
 
104  As with the court’s reliance 
on the danger of corruption, the argument is based on the structural tension 
that arises when contribution limitations are limited but expenditures are 
not.  To raise the large and growing sums needed to finance campaigns 
when contributions per donor are limited, candidates must devote ever-
increasing time and effort to pursuing potential contributors.  With time a 
scarce resource, these fundraising efforts necessarily cut into the time 
available for candidates to meet with ordinary voters and for officeholders 
to attend to “information gathering, political and policy analysis, debating 
and compromising with fellow representatives, and the public 
dissemination of views.”105  As already noted, this argument was also 
raised by one member of the Sixth Circuit panel in Kruse106 and by a 
member of the Tenth Circuit panel in Homans.107  Moreover, Buckley 
relied upon the public interest in reducing the time burdens of fundraising 
when it upheld the optional public funding of presidential candidates.108
In considering whether the spending limits were narrowly tailored to 
promote the state’s compelling goals, the Landell majority found the 
Vermont limits advance the state’s anti-corruption and time protection 
 
 
 102. Id. at 118-19. 
 103. Id. 
 104. For the intellectual foundation of the time-protection argument, see generally 
Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why Campaign 
Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1281 
(1994). 
 105. Id. at 1282-83. 
 106. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43 (discussing Judge Cohn’s treatment of the 
time-protection argument). 
 107. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Lucero’s finding that 
the time-protection argument was conceptually different from the cost-limitation argument 
rejected in Buckley).  Justice Kennedy also raised this concern in  Shrink Missouri.  528 U.S. 
377, 409 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see infra notes 141-46 and accompanying text. 
 108. 424 U.S. 1, 96 (1976). 
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goals, and that the specific spending caps adopted are high enough to 
permit “effective advocacy.”109  But the Second Circuit determined that the 
district court had not considered whether spending limits are the “least 
restrictive means” for attaining these goals.110  Specifically, the panel noted 
that the district court had not considered whether a program of voluntary 
spending limits, coupled with incentives to accept such limitssuch as 
higher contribution limits or the provision of public funding to participating 
candidateswould be “as effective in advancing the asserted interests” 
justifying spending limits.111  The Second Circuit remanded to the district 
court the question of whether these alternative means would be as effective 
in vindicating the state’s goals while imposing less of a burden on First 
Amendment rights.112
Judge Winter dissented.
 
113  Although much of his dissent focused on the 
specific terms of the Vermont limitsincluding the application of a single 
limit to both primary and general elections in the same election cycle, the 
Act’s broad definition of expenditure, and the low level of the limits114
 
 109. Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 125-31 (2d Cir. 2004). 
he 
 110. Id. at 97, 131. 
 111. Id. at 133. 
 112. Id. at 135-36, 136 n.25.  The court also asked the district court on remand to 
reexamine whether the specific spending limits in the law were constitutionally sound in 
light of certain arguments raised by Judge Winter’s dissent.  The district court had found, 
and the panel had agreed, that the statutory spending limits were consistent with actual 
levels of campaign spending in Vermont and thus would not impede effective advocacy.  
Judge Winter, however, argued that data on past spending levels did not take into account 
the costs of compliance with the new law, nor did they consider “related expenditures” on 
behalf of a candidate by individuals or organizations other than the candidate, which the 
Vermont law treats as both contributions by the entity making the expenditure and 
expenditures of the candidate benefited.  See id. at 166-68. The majority asked the district 
court to take these factors into account in its reconsideration of the spending limits.  Id. at 
134 n.23. 
 113. Id. at 149 (Winter, J., dissenting).  Judge Winter’s dissent was endorsed by four of 
the dissenters from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc in the most laudatory 
terms.  Chief Judge Walker described Judge Winter’s dissent as “impassioned, insightful, 
and carefully reasoned,” Landel v. Sorrell, No. 00-9159(L), 2005 WL 826151, at *2 (2d Cir. 
Feb. 11, 2005), amended Apr. 11, 2005, Apr. 20, 2005, and May 11, 2005; Judge Jacobs 
praised the Winter opinion as “scintillating . . . learned and witty,” id. at *9; Judge Cabranes 
agreed that the Winter dissent was “comprehensive and fully persuasive . . . a tour de force.” 
Id. at *13.  Judge Wesley joined all three dissents without writing one of his own.  Even 
four of the judges who concurred in the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc agreed 
that Judge Winter’s opinion was “thorough and forceful.” Id. at *1 (Sack, J., and Katzmann, 
J., concurring). 
 114. Landell, 382 F.3d at 150-83.  Four of the dissenters from the denial of the petition 
for rehearing en banc also specifically adverted to the very low level of the spending limit 
imposed by the Vermont law. See Landell, 2005 WL 826151, at *8 (“These limits are 
drastically below realistic spending levels for competitive races.”) (Walker, C.J., 
dissenting); id. at *14 (“The particular expenditure limits imposed by Act 64 are so 
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also determined that the majority’s justifications for spending limits were 
precluded by Buckley.115  Moreover, he criticized the majority’s decision to 
remand the “least restrictive means” question to the district court, finding it 
“self-evident” that “a combination of public and private financing with low 
contribution limits is infinitely less restrictiveis actually speech 
supportiveand accomplishes all the ostensible purposes” of the Vermont 
spending limits.116
In February 2005, the full Second Circuit rejected a petition to rehear 
Landell en banc.
 
117  Subsequently, five members of the court dissented 
from the denial of the rehearing en banc, with four of the dissenters 
emphatically rejecting the panel opinion and  strongly asserting that 
Buckley precluded any finding that Vermont’s spending limits could be 
constitutional.118  The dissenters reiterated the traditional view that Buckley 
bars the use of anti-corruption arguments to sustain spending limits,119 
rejected out of hand the argument that officeholder time protection could be 
a compelling government interest,120 and, in impassioned terms, denounced 
the very idea of expenditure limitations.121
Seven members of the Second Circuit joined in opinions 
concurring in the denial of the rehearing en banc. This group 
included Judges Straub and Pooler, who had been on the Landell 
panel, and Judges Sack, Katzmann, Sotomayor, and B.D. Parker, 
who joined in an opinion written by Judges Sack and Katzmann that 
emphasized that the denial of rehearing en banc was based on the 
Second Circuit’s longstanding tradition of rejecting en banc review 
and was not a consideration of the merits.
 
122
 
laughably low . . . .”) (Cabranes, J., dissenting). 
  Only Judge Calabresi’s 
 115. 382 F.3d at 184. 
 116. Landell, 382 F.3d at 207. 
 117. Landell, 2005 WL 826151. 
 118. Chief Judge Walker and Judges Jacobs, Cabranes, Raggi, and Wesley dissented.  
Judge Raggi’s brief dissent declined “to express an opinion on the merits,” and simply 
concluded that “this case presents serious questions that warrant further consideration by the 
whole court.”  Id. at *14.  Chief Judge Walker and Judges Jacobs, Cabranes, and Wesley 
also disagreed with the panel’s resolution of the merits.  Chief Judge Walker and Judges 
Jacobs and Cabranes each wrote an opinion which was joined by the other judges who 
dissented on the merits. 
 119. See id. at *5 (Walker, C.J., dissenting); id. at *10 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
 120. See id. at *6 (Walker, C.J., dissenting); id. at *10 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
 121. See id. at *2 (panel opinion sets a “dangerous precedent”) (Walker, C.J., dissenting); 
id. at *13 (“The Act at issue in this case is as unconstitutional as if Vermont were to create a 
dukedom, apply a thumbscrew, or tax Wisconsin cheese.”) (Jacobs, J., dissenting); id. at *14 
(stating they were “bald-faced political protectionism”) (Cabranes, J., dissenting). 
 122. See id. at *1 (Sack, J., and Katzmann, J., concurring); see also id. (citing Jon O. 
Newman, In Banc Practice in the Second Circuit: The Virtues of Restraint, 50 BROOK. L. 
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separate concurrence addressed the First Amendment issues 
presented by Vermont’s expenditure limitation. More radically than 
the panel majority, Judge Calabresi directly challenged Buckley’s 
framing of the constitutionality of campaign finance regulation solely 
in terms of the prevention of corruption and the appearance of 
corruption. Instead, he made inequality the centerpiece of his 
analysis. As he put it, the impact of wealth inequalities on elections 
is “the huge elephant—and donkey—in the living room in all 
discussions of campaign finance reform.”123  Indeed, he suggested, 
“it is not entirely out of the question” that equality as well as anti-
corruption and time-protection concerns were behind Vermont’s 
decision to adopt candidate spending limits.124  “[T]he sort of 
conversation taking place in Vermont (and elsewhere) would be a far 
more fruitful one—from the standpoints both of campaign finance 
policy and constitutional jurisprudence—were it able to be brought 
out from under Buckley’s corruption mantle and into a framework 
that more honestly reflects the issues at play.”125  Judge Calabresi 
concluded that the Supreme Court’s reconsideration of Buckley to 
permit consideration of equality arguments is “essential” to a “free 
and open discussion” of campaign finance regulation, and that the 
best way to speed that reconsideration was to deny rehearing en banc 
and move Landell closer to Supreme Court review.126
The sharpness of the division within the Second Circuit, both 
within the Landell panel and over the decision whether to hear the 
 
 
REV. 365, 371 (1984) (noting that the Second Circuit voted to hear only six cases en banc, 
while denying petitions for rehearing in nineteen cases between 1979 and 1983)).  These 
four concurring judges avoided any comment on the First Amendment merits of the case, 
except to say “we doubt it,” id. at *1, n.3, in response to the contention of Judge Jacobs that 
the Landell panel’s decision was attributable to the “many constitutional-law professors and 
news media [that] lend their prestige and voice to such measures.”  Id. at *12. 
 123. Id. at *1. 
 124. Id. at *1.  Judge Calabresi saw campaign spending limitations as implicitly raising 
two types of inequality concerns.  “The first is the generalized egalitarian desire not to 
advantage one group in society over another.”  Id.  In the campaign finance setting, that 
means “the deeply felt desire not to have the wealthy be able to influence elections more 
than the poor.”  Id.  Second, he suggested that unlimited campaign spending privileges the 
ability of the wealthy, relative to the poor, to “express the intensity of their political 
feelings. . . .  In other words, and crucially, a large contribution by a person of great means 
may influence an election enormously, and yet may represent a far less intensity of desire 
than a pittance given by a poor person.”  Id.  Judge Calabresi indicated that this differential 
wealth-bounded ability to express intensities of political feelings is a First Amendment 
concern—“the First Amendment right to have one’s intensity of desire, as expressed in 
monetary terms, be measured equally.”  Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
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case en banc, coming shortly after the Tenth Circuit’s Homans 
decision that Buckley is not an absolute bar to spending limits, 
clearly demonstrates the increasingly intense conflict within the 
lower courts concerning the meaning of Buckley and the future of 
campaign finance jurisprudence. 
D. Landell and the Supreme Court’s Evolving Campaign Finance 
Jurisprudence 
Landell is a sharp break from Buckley’s rejection of candidate spending 
limits, but it is in some respects foreshadowed by other developments in the 
Supreme Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence, particularly the Court’s 
recent decision in McConnell v. FEC.127  Indeed, the Second Circuit panel 
repeatedly invoked McConnell in its Landell decision.128  Landell’s 
reliance on McConnell is, in some sense, curious since McConnell upheld 
the “soft money” restrictions of the federal Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act of 2002 (“BCRA”), and “soft money” consists of contributions to 
parties, rather than expenditures by candidates.129  Indeed, McConnell 
restated Buckley’s contribution/expenditure distinction,130 and relied on it 
in justifying the application of the lower standard of review used for 
contribution limits to BCRA’s soft money restrictions.131
 
 127. 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
  Yet, the Second 
Circuit’s use of McConnell does accurately capture the Supreme Court’s 
increasingly deferential approach to campaign finance regulation, 
McConnell’s  recognition that campaign finance restrictions advance as 
well as burden constitutional values, and the relevance of the justifications 
for soft money regulation to spending limitation.  In addition to McConnell, 
although the Supreme Court has never directly challenged Buckley’s 
 128. See, e.g., Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 97 nn.1-2, 108, 108 n.6, 11-15, 116 n.11, 
117 n.12, 118 n.13, 124, 124 n.17 (2d Cir. 2004).  Judge Calabresi’s concurrence in the 
denial of rehearing en banc also saw in McConnell a “broader understanding of the 
‘corruption’ rationale than what Buckley enunciated—an understanding that could perhaps 
be read as gesturing toward some of the ‘equality’ considerations that Buckley purportedly 
purged from the debate.”  See Landell, 2005 WL 826151 at *1 n.6. 
 129. See 540 U.S. at 224.  According to Federal Election Commission member Bradley 
A. Smith “[a]ny money that is not contributed directly to a candidate’s campaign or used 
expressly to advocate the election or defeat of a candidate constitutes a form of soft money, 
although the term is used most often when discussing such donations made to political 
parties.”  BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH 185 (2001). 
 130. 540 U.S. at 120-21. 
 131. Id. at 134-37.  The dissenters from the denial of the rehearing en banc in Landell 
emphasized McConnell’s limitation to contribution restrictions, and its implicit preservation 
of the contribution/expenditure distinction.  See Landell, 2005 WL 826151 at *3 (Walker, 
C.J., dissenting). 
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treatment of spending limitations, other decisions by the Court are in 
tension with Buckley’s holding. 
First, the Supreme Court has actually upheld expenditure limits.  In 
McConnell, the Court upheld bans on both corporate and labor union 
election spending.132  Prior to McConnell, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce133 sustained a state law banning corporate election 
expenditures, finding the prohibition justified by a compelling interest in 
controlling “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of 
wealth” which could “unfairly influence elections when . . . deployed in the 
form of independent expenditures.”134
To be sure, Austin found that corporate spending poses a unique danger 
of corruption because corporations enjoy a “unique state-conferred 
corporate structure” that enables them to accumulate large sums of 
money.
  Austin suggests a concern about the 
inequality of political influence, notwithstanding Buckley’s rejection of 
inequality as a justification for spending limits. 
135  A corporation’s financial resources reflect the success of the 
corporation’s commercial activities and not the extent of support for its 
political ideas.  Limits on corporations have, thus, been held to be justified 
“to ensure that substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special 
advantages which go with the corporate form of organization . . . [are] 
not . . . converted into political ‘war’ chests.”136  Yet, Austin’s attempt to 
limit its concern with large campaign war chests to corporations is 
unpersuasive.  It is hard to see why a corporation’s state-granted 
advantages make its speech any more corrupting than the speech of wealthy 
individuals or noncorporate groups.  Moreover, as Justice Scalia pointed 
out in his Austin dissent, corporations are not alone in receiving special 
advantages from the state.137  Other business associationsas well as 
billionaire individuals who benefit from inheritance laws or obtain their 
wealth from investments in corporationsmay build up campaign war 
chests “that have little or no correlation to the public’s support”138 for their 
political ideas.139
 
 132. 540 U.S. at 201-02.  McConnell is the first decision in the post-Buckley era that 
expressly treats the prohibition on both corporations and unions against using their treasury 
funds in election campaigns as constitutional. 
  Nor is it clear how Austin’s reasons for limiting 
corporate spending justify the limits on union spending upheld in 
 133. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 134. Id. at 660. 
 135. Id.  
 136. FEC v. Nat. Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207 (1982) (citations omitted). 
 137. 494 U.S. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 138. Id. at 660. 
 139. See id. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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McConnell.  Although the Court has doctrinally bracketed corporations and 
unions as special cases, the only justification for the corporate and union 
spending limits that the Court has articulated sounds a lot more like the 
equality rationale rejected in Buckley than the corruption concern that has 
been the only formally recognized basis for limiting campaign finance 
activities. 
Second, the Court in McConnell significantly reframed the way it 
addresses the constitutionality of campaign finance regulation.  Tracking 
the formulation articulated by Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, 
concurring in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,140  McConnell 
treated campaign finance laws not simply as burdens on speech and 
association, but as positive “measures aimed at promoting the integrity of 
the [political] process.”141  Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Shrink 
Missouri suggested that campaign finance law involves not one set of 
constitutional principlesfreedom of speech and associationbut the 
reconciliation of “competing constitutional interests,”  including the 
promotion of democracy.142  Moreover, McConnell followed the Shrink 
Missouri Breyer concurrence in giving a striking degree of judicial 
deference to legislative judgments on campaign finance regulation.  
McConnell repeatedly recognized Congress’s “particular expertise”143 
concerning the impact of specific campaign finance practices and their 
effects on both elections and government decision-making.144  Indeed, the 
Court deferred to Congress not just with respect to political facts and 
electoral predictions, but also concerning the weight to be given to those 
facts and predictions in balancing democracy-promoting regulation against 
the speech and associational rights of parties and interest groups.145
Finally, both Justice Kennedy’s dissent and Justice Breyer’s concurrence 
in Shrink Missouri, as well as the opinion for the Court in McConnell, 
focused attention on the “post-Buckley experience”
  
146 in considering the 
constitutional questions posed by campaign finance regulation. Justice 
Kennedy lamented that “Buckley has not worked,”147
 
 140. See 528 U.S. 377, 401 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 explaining that “by 
accepting half of what Congress did (limiting contributions) but rejecting 
 141. 540 U.S. 93, 137 (2003). 
 142. 528 U.S. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 143. 540 U.S. at 137. 
 144. See id. at 153, 156, 157, 165, 167, 185, 207. 
 145. Id. at 137. 
 146. 528 U.S. at 405 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing id. at 406-09 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting)). 
 147. Id. at 408 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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the other (limiting expenditures)”148  Buckley “created a misshapen system” 
marked by massive avoidance of contribution limits.149  Although Justice 
Kennedy indicated  he preferred to invalidate both contribution and 
expenditure limits, he was willing to “leave open the possibility that 
Congress, or a state legislature, might devise a system in which there are 
some limits on both expenditures and contributions.”150  He specifically 
noted that  a benefit of such a system is that it would “permit[] 
officeholders to concentrate their time and efforts on official duties rather 
than on fundraising.”151  Justice Breyer suggested that a review of the post-
Buckley experience might lead the Court to “mak[e] less absolute the 
contribution/expenditure line, particularly in respect to independently 
wealthy candidates.”152  Without directly challenging the 
contribution/expenditure line, McConnell relied heavily on the post-
Buckley experience in concluding that the distinction Buckley had drawn 
between “express advocacy” and “issue advocacy” was “functionally 
meaningless,” thereby upholding BCRA’s restrictions and requirements 
with respect to electioneering communication.153  So, too, the McConnell 
Court agreed that the extensive post-Buckley efforts by candidates, 
contributors, and interest groups alike to avoid Buckley’s limits justified 
BCRA’s aggressive anti-circumvention provisions.154
Thus, although McConnell does not directly challenge Buckley’s 
approach to expenditure limitations and, indeed, relies on it in validating 
BCRA’s limits on soft money contributions, McConnell’s concern for 
democratic values, its deference to Congressional fact-finding, and its 
willingness to reconsider aspects of the campaign finance doctrine 
articulated in Buckley in light of the post-Buckley experience all indicate 
that the Landell majority’s repeated invocation of McConnell is entirely 
appropriate.  McConnell, the separate opinions in Shrink Missouri, and the 
Court’s partial reliance on inequality concerns in Austin, together suggest 
that, while Landell surely represents a sharp break from Buckley, it is not 
entirely out of step with the Supreme Court’s evolving campaign finance 
jurisprudence. 
 
 
 148. Id. at 407. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 409. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 405 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 153. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 193 (2003). 
 154. Id. at 185. 
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II.  THE LANDELL REMAND: IS PUBLIC FUNDING A LESS RESTRICTIVE 
ALTERNATIVE TO SPENDING LIMITS? 
In ordering a remand, the Landell panel raised the surprising possibility 
that two longstanding and traditionally complementary tenets of campaign 
finance reform— public funding and spending limits— may, ironically, be 
in conflict with each other.  Although the Second Circuit found that both 
the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption and the 
protection of candidate time from the burdens of fund-raising are 
compelling constitutional concerns that could justify candidate spending 
limits, the court asked the district court to consider on remand whether 
there are less constitutionally burdensome means of achieving those 
goals.155  Specifically, the appeals court directed the district court to assess 
whether the possibility that the Vermont legislature could adopt a program 
of voluntary public funding, with spending limits accepted by candidates as 
a condition for receiving public funds, is such a less restrictive means.156
Judge Winter, in his dissent, found it “self-evident” that public funding 
would be a less restrictive way of “freeing candidates of improper influence 
from particular donors and relieving candidates of the need for extensive 
fundraising.”
  If 
so, then spending limits would be unconstitutional. 
157  He concluded that a remand was unnecessary to address 
the less restrictive means question since the possibility of public funding 
was certainly a less constitutionally burdensome way of achieving the 
state’s goals than mandatory spending limits.158
Judge Winter is correct in noting that public funding can reduce both the 
time burdens of fundraising and the ability of private interest groups to reap 
the quid pro quo benefits of providing candidates with financial support 
since public funding by definition provides candidates with an alternative 
to private fundraising.  But, although public funding is an alternative to 
spending limits, it should not be treated as a less restrictive means than 
spending limits of promoting these goals. 
 
First, all existing public funding systems include spending limits.  Thus, 
they burden campaign speech as much as spending limits without public 
funding.  To be sure, the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of 
 
 155. Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 148 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 156. Id. at 131-33. 
 157. Id. at 207 (Winter, J., dissenting); see also Homans III, 366 F.3d 900, 914 (10th Cir. 
2004) (mentioning public funding as an alternative version of campaign finance reform). 
 158. Landell, 382 F.3d at 207. 
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these limits on the theory that they are voluntarily agreed to by the 
candidate who has chosen to accept public funding.159
Of course, a public funding system without spending limits is 
theoretically possible.  In such a program of floors without ceilings, 
candidates could be given a basic amount of public funds to assure all 
candidates the ability to compete at some appropriate level, but then 
candidates would be free to raise whatever they can and to spend whatever 
they can raise.  This would not burden speech, but candidates would remain 
free to amass and use unlimited private donations.  Such a system would be 
largely ineffective in attaining the anti-corruption and time-protection goals 
relied on by the Landell court. 
  But that assumes 
candidates have the right to decline public funding (and the concomitant 
limits).  If that is the case, then optional public funding, even with limits, 
will not be an effective way of achieving the anti-corruption and time-
protection interests approved by the Landell court. 
Second, even assuming a voluntarily-accepted spending limit as a 
condition for public funding is somehow both less of a burden on speech 
and equally effective in achieving the anti-corruption and time-protection 
goals, it should not be treated as a less restrictive alternative in the 
constitutional sense.  A program should be considered a less restrictive 
alternative to an enacted program only if it is similar in kind to the enacted 
program and comparably available politically.160
Public funding, however, is a totally different type of government 
intervention into the financing of a political campaign.  By  providing 
candidates with taxpayer dollars, rather than by limiting private funds, 
public funding  changes the structure of the campaign finance system.  It is, 
thus, a significant departure from both traditional forms of campaign 
  Thus, a higher spending 
limit would be a less restrictive alternative to a lower spending limit, 
although it might be less effective at reaching the spending limit’s goals.  
So, too, a higher contribution limit would be a less restrictive and 
potentially effective alternative for attaining the time-protection goals of a 
spending limit, although it could undermine the anti-corruption goal.  Both 
a higher contribution limit and a higher spending limit are similar in kind to 
a lower spending limit, as they both involve restrictions on the raising and 
spending of private campaign funds.  These alternatives are both 
presumably politically available to the legislature that adopted a lower 
spending limit. 
 
 159. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 n.65 (1976) (treating a candidate acceptance of 
spending limits as a condition for public funding as voluntary). 
 160. See Blasi, supra note 104, at 1318 (noting that an optional system might increase 
time spent fundraising). 
BRIFFAULTCHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:01 PM 
2005] RETURN OF SPENDING LIMITS  125 
finance and traditional forms of campaign finance regulation.  Moreover, as 
Federal Election Commission Chairman Bradley Smith has noted, there is 
an “almost endless array” of public funding systems.161  Adopting a public 
funding system involves complex choices concerning which candidates are 
to get funds, how much funding any candidate is to get, what is the basis 
for deciding how much a candidate gets, and  what conditions apply to 
publicly funded candidates.162  Some public funding systems, like that used 
in the presidential general election, provide qualifying candidates with a 
flat grant.163  Others match some fraction of private contributions, although 
at varying ratios of public dollars to private dollars.164
Not only is public funding categorically distinct from contribution and 
expenditure limitations, but public funding is also quite controversial.  
Although, as I have argued elsewhere, public funding would be an 
extremely positive campaign finance reform,
  In short, public 
funding presents many complex questions that are totally different from 
those raised by contribution and spending limits. 
165 public funding has drawn 
considerable political and ideological opposition.  Whereas most 
jurisdictions impose some limitations on contributions, only a relatively 
small number provide public funding.166  Public funding is often derided as 
“welfare for politicians.”  Certainly, as Chairman Smith has noted, “[t]here 
are many who have a blanket objection to any government financing of 
campaigns as inherently beyond the scope of . . . good government.”167  
Indeed, in Congress the Republican Party has opposed public funding as 
“an issue of principle”168
Third, public funding may not be as effective at advancing the anti-
corruption and time-protection goals cited by the Second Circuit unless 
 as well as on political grounds.  It is doubtful that 
a measure that is both so different from spending and has drawn such 
consistent political and philosophical opposition should be considered an 
available alternative to spending limits. 
 
 161. SMITH, supra note 129, at 89. 
 162. See id. at 88-105. 
 163. Id. at 96.  “Matching” funds of up to $250 per contribution are provided to all 
candidates seeking his or her party nomination who raises at least $5000 in each of twenty 
states in amounts of $250 or less.  Id. 
 164. Id. at 97. 
 165. See generally Richard Briffault, Public Funding and Democratic Elections, 148 U. 
PA. L. REV. 563 (1999) [hereinafter Briffault, Public Funding] . 
 166. See id. at 566-67 (noting that public funding is used in presidential elections as well 
as in statewide elections in Minnesota and Wisconsin, and in local elections in New York 
City and Los Angeles). 
 167. SMITH, supra note 129, at 89. 
 168. See Blasi, supra note 104, at 1318. 
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mandatory spending caps are imposed even on candidates who do not 
accept public funds.  As long as candidates are free to opt out of public 
funding (and the spending limits that are a part of all public funding 
programs), some candidates will do so.  There will be candidates who will 
want to spend well above the public funding limit and who believe they 
will be able to raise the funds that will enable them to do so.  These will 
often be candidates who are either backed by extensive fundraising 
networks, or are personally wealthy.  George W. Bush, who opted out of 
the presidential pre-nomination public funding limits in 2000 and 2004, 
exemplifies the first category, as does John Kerry, who also opted out of 
the presidential primary public funding system in 2004.169  Michael 
Bloomberg, who drew on his enormous personal wealth to opt out of New 
York City’s mayoral public funding system in 2001, exemplifies the second 
category.170
Not only do the candidates in the first category create corruption, 
appearance of corruption, and time-burden problems for themselves, but 
both types of opt-out candidates re-create the corruption, appearance of 
corruption, and time burden problems for their opponents and the electoral 
system as a whole.  So long as some candidates are able to spend without 
limit, there will be pressure on their opponents to raise and spend amounts 
that will match the high-spenders.  This will tend to force some candidates 
who might have preferred to take public funding with spending limits to 
opt for private funding without limits.  This is particularly likely to occur 
when the public funding level is not high enough to support effective 
campaigning.  Due to the political resistance to public funding previously 
mentioned, even when public funding systems are adopted, they are often 
underfunded and so do not provide adequate resources to participating 
candidates.
 
171
Public funding should be seen not as an alternative to spending limits, 
but as a complement to it, and vice versa. Spending limits with public 
funding will do a better job of reducing the potentially corruptive effects of 
campaign contributions and reducing the time burdens of fundraising than 
  But in any event, due to opt-outs, so long as public funding 
is voluntary, it will not be as effective in attaining the anti-corruption and 
time-protection goals as mandatory spending limits. 
 
 169. See Campaign Legal Ctr., Presidential Public Funding System: Problems of the 
Public Funding System, at http://www.campaignfinanceguide.org/guide-53.html (last visited 
May 6, 2005). 
 170. See PAUL RYAN, CTR. FOR GOV’T STUDIES, A STATUTE OF LIBERTY: HOW NEW YORK 
CITY’S CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW IS CHANGING THE FACE OF LOCAL ELECTIONs 2,  available 
at http://www.cgs.org/publications/docs/nycreport.pdf. 
 171. See Briffault, Public Funding, supra note 165, at 586, 568 n.73. 
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spending limits without public funding. After all, without public funding, 
even candidates subject to spending limits must still spend time and effort 
in raising funds and they will still be dependent on the financial support of 
their contributors.  Personally wealthy candidates, of course,  are not 
subject to the potentially corruptive effects of private contributions and are 
not burdened by the requirements of fundraising.  Most candidates, 
however, are not wealthy enough to fund their own campaigns, nor would 
it be desirable to solve the corruption and time-protection problems by 
restricting elective office to the rich.  Public funding, as Judge Winter 
noted, theoretically solves the corruption and time-burden problems while 
actually providing new resources for electoral communication which can be 
particularly beneficial to political newcomers and challengers.172
III.  MAKING THE CASE FOR SPENDING LIMITS 
  But, in 
practice, the effectiveness of public funding would be greatly strengthened 
if all candidates were subject to spending limits. 
Although Landell did not uphold Vermont’s spending limits, the Second 
Circuit did find that spending limits could be constitutional. The court read 
Buckley’s invalidation of FECA’s spending limits as just a rejection of  the 
specific justifications put forward and considered by the Supreme Court.173  
Buckley found only that “[n]o governmental interest that has been 
suggested is sufficient to justify” the First Amendment burden created by 
FECA’s spending limits;174
More controversially, the Landell court determined that, in light of the 
changed campaign finance circumstances since Buckley, one of the 
arguments for spending limits that was rejected by Buckleythe prevention 
of corruption and the appearance of corruptioncan now provide a 
constitutionally sufficient justification for limits.
 but, Landell found, Buckley did not hold that 
there is no governmental interest that could justify limits. 
175  Unlike Buckley, the 
Second Circuit found that, in the absence of spending limits, contribution 
limits have failed to stem the corruption danger because the need for 
unlimited funds compels candidates to turn to intermediaries and bundlers 
in their quest for campaign money.176
 
 172. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
  Despite this departure from Buckley, 
Landell still hews to Buckley’s basic approach of focusing on the impact of 
the process of raising the funds necessary to pay for unlimited spending on 
 173. Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 106-10 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 174. Buckley v. Veleo, 424 U.S. 1, 55 (1976). 
 175. See Landell, 382 F.3d at 115-19. 
 176. See id. at 118. 
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the behavior of officeholders and the consequences for governance. Like 
Buckley, Landell focused on the potentially corrupting effects of the pursuit 
of contributions on the integrity of officerholder decisions, and on the 
potential effects of the appearance of such corruption on public confidence 
in government.177 Landell added to Buckley’s corruption concern 
consideration of the distracting effect unlimited fundraising has on 
officeholder time and governance.178
As I will suggest in the next two sections of this Part, although Landell’s 
governance concerns are important, it is uncertain whether, by themselves, 
they provide a constitutionally sufficient basis to justify spending limits.  
The constitutional case for spending limits becomes clearer when the 
impact of unlimited spending—which, of course, means unequal 
spending—on fundamental features of democratic elections, particularly 
electoral competitiveness and voter equality are taken into account.  
Electoral competition, voter equality, and concerns about governance 
together form an overarching interest in democratic self-government which 
may provide a constitutionally compelling case for spending limits. 
  But in looking at the impact on a 
campaign spending practice on governance rather than on the election 
itself, Landell is still on the same wavelength as Buckley. 
A. The Prevention of Corruption and the Appearance of Corruption 
The heart of Landell’s corruption justification is that Buckley failed to 
anticipate how the rise of bundlingdue in part to the negative synergy of 
limited contributions and unlimited spendingre-introduced the potential 
for corruption and the appearance of corruption inherent in large 
contributions back into the campaign finance system.179  In revisiting this 
aspect of Buckley, Landell drew comfort from language in McConnell in 
which the Court indicated it was willing to reconsider some of its earlier 
campaign finance judgments in light of the post-Buckley experience.180
 
 177. See id. at 116-17. 
  
McConnell gave great weight to the rise of campaign finance practices that 
enable candidates and donors to effectively circumvent FECA’s limits on 
large contributions while abiding by the letter of the law.  The “soft 
money” which was the major target of BCRA allowed donors and 
candidates to evade contribution restrictions by channeling large 
contributions to political parties which could not have been given directly 
 178. See id. at 119-24. 
 179. Id. at 118 (explaining that bundling could lead to contributor dominance in political 
campaigns, which could corrupt the process). 
 180. See id. at 118 n.13 (emphasizing that bundling can lead to the appearance of 
corruption). 
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to the candidates.181  McConnell not only upheld tight restrictions on the 
soft money practices that had provoked Congress into enacting BCRA, but 
also sustained limits on other practices which had not yet proven 
problematic, but which Congress feared might become future conduits for 
campaign finance law evasion.182
Landell is no doubt right that McConnell would support regulation 
aimed at preventing the corruption and appearance of corruption dangers 
posed by bundling.  Landell is also no doubt correct in finding that the 
absence of spending limits poses a major incentive to bundling.  But it is 
not clear that a spending limit is the least constitutionally restrictive means 
of addressing the bundling problem.  One arguably less restrictive way of 
dealing with the potentially corruptive consequences of bundling is direct 
regulation of bundling itself.  In the past, Congress considered legislation 
that would treat contributions collected or arranged by an intermediary as 
contributions of that intermediary, subject to contribution limits.
  The post-Buckley experience with 
evasion thus led the Court both to sustain restrictions on campaign finance 
practices that did not involve the direct transmission of funds from donors 
to candidates and to defer to Congress’s judgment concerning what 
campaign practices are likely to cause the same dangers of corruption and 
the appearance of corruption as direct contributions to candidates. 
183
Buckley may have overstated the ability of contribution limits to address 
the corruption danger by failing to consider how the interplay of 
contribution limits and unlimited spending provides intermediaries and 
bundlers with an opportunity to play a pivotal role in campaign finance, 
thereby bolstering their influence on government. But it is not clear that 
even this more sophisticated understanding of the corruption problem, 
taken by itself, is sufficient to justify spending limits given the possibility 
of attacking the bundling problem without directly capping spending.  So 
long as the only constitutionally cognizable justification for limiting 
campaign finance practices is the corruptive effect of donations on 
  While 
no such rule was adopted, the anti-bundling proposals suggest an 
alternative means of addressing the potentially corruptive nature of the 
bundled contributions that is less restrictive of candidate speech than 
spending limits. 
 
 181. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 145-48 (2003). 
 182. See id. at 178-81 (upholding BCRA § 323(d), 2 U.S.C. § 441i(d) (2005)), 184-89 
(upholding BCRA § 323(f), 2 U.S.C. § 441i(f)); see also Richard Briffault, McConnell v. 
FEC and the Transformation of Campaign Finance Law, 3 ELECTION L.J. 147, 149, 167 
(2004). 
 183. See, e.g., DAVID B. MAGLEBY & CANDICE J. NELSON, THE MONEY CHASE: 
CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 193-94 (1990); FRANK J. SORAUF, INSIDE 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE: MYTHS AND REALITIES 207-08 (1992). 
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officeholders (and the demoralizing “appearance of corruption” on a 
broader public aware of these contributions), spending limits will always be 
subject to the argument than restrictions on contributions, including 
bundling, are a less constitutionally burdensome means of achieving the 
anti-corruption goal. Indeed, even the Second Circuit appeared to recognize 
that the corruption and appearance of corruption concerns alone did not 
provide the necessary constitutional predicate for spending limits when it 
turned to a second justificationofficeholder and candidate time 
protection. 
B. Time Protection 
The time-protection argument is a very appealing justification for 
campaign spending limitation because it gets at some of the most disturbing 
consequences of our campaign finance system—the distraction of 
officeholders from the public business they are elected to address, and the 
increasing tendency of the fundraising system to discourage potential 
candidates from running for office.184  Moreover, although the time-
protection concern was arguably before the Buckley Court,185
Preliminarily, like the anti-bundling argument, the time-protection 
justification may be open to the response that there is a less restrictive 
fund-raising law change that would also protect candidate and officeholder 
timean increase in the contribution limits.  A key reason why candidates 
 the Court did 
not discuss it in the context of spending limits so it cannot be said that 
Buckley ruled out this justification for spending limits.  Landell also 
correctly concluded that the time-justification argument should not be 
considered precluded by Buckley’s rejection of high and rising campaign 
costs as a justification for spending limits since time protection addresses a 
different concern.  As a result, there is less of a precedential barrier to the 
time-protection argument than to the anti-corruption argument.  Indeed, an 
important aspect of the time-protection argument is that begins to push the 
campaign finance debate beyond the corruption/appearance of corruption 
framework to consider the broader impact of our campaign finance system 
on our political process. Yet the time-protection argument, like the anti-
bundling concern, is still primarily focused on the impact of unlimited and 
unequal spending on government decision-making, rather than on the 
fairness of elections themselves. 
 
 184. See id. at 189 n.24 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1975)). 
 185. See Landell, 382 F.3d at 188-89 (Winter, J., dissenting) (noting that the time-
protection argument was relied on by the Court of Appeals in Buckley, was discussed in the 
brief filed on behalf of the Attorney General and Solicitor General, and was mentioned by 
the Supreme Court) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976)). 
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have to spend so much time raising money is because they are allowed to 
accept only a limited amount per donor.  If donors could make larger 
donations, more money could be raised with less effort and less use of 
candidate time.  Of course, this would exacerbate the potentially corrupting 
consequences of large donations, so that raising contribution limits, while 
less restrictive, will also be less effective in improving the quality of 
government.  So, a spending limit may be the least restrictive means of 
advancing the time-protection goal consistent with also pursuing the anti-
corruption goals vindicated by contribution limits.186
Thus, the more important question is whether reducing the time-burdens 
of fundraising is a compelling government purpose.  The time-protection 
argument combines two distinct elementsthe impact of fundraising 
burdens on candidates, and the separate impact on officeholders.  For 
candidates, the argument is that fundraising needs distort campaigning by 
forcing candidates to spend time with potential donors rather than with 
other voters.
 
187
The crux of the time-protection argument, thus, must be the protection of 
officeholder time.  The original and most effective development of the 
time-protection argument focused on the need to protect officeholder time, 
freeing elected officials to devote more of their energies to the 
  According to this view, spending limitsprovided the 
limits are high enough to allow for effective campaigningwould free 
candidates to spend more time with ordinary, non-wealthy voters.  This is 
an attractive goal, but it is not clear that the government has a compelling 
interest in determining how candidates campaign or which groups they 
target with their appeals.  Moreover, it is unlikely that the candidates will 
actually ignore non-donor voters.  Fundraising may require candidates to 
give greater attention to donors and potential donors than their votes alone 
would warrant, but all candidates will eventually have to aim their 
campaigns at the voters, and not just at donors, since, ultimately, candidates 
need votes in order to win.  So the candidate portion of the time-protection 
argument reduces to a government interest in the relative shares of 
candidate time devoted to donors versus nondonor voters. 
 
 186. Public funding would also arguably be a less restrictive means of protecting 
candidate time than spending limits.  Unlike spending limits, public funding actually gives 
candidates funds, thus more directly protecting candidate time than simply capping the total 
a candidate can spend. The reasons previously given in Part II as to why public funding may 
not be appropriately treated as a less restrictive alternative are also applicable here.   As with 
the anti-corruption concern, spending limits and public funding could work well together to 
protect officeholder time; they should not be seen as mutually exclusive. 
 187. See Landell, 382 F.3d at 119-24; Blasi, supra note 104, at 1282-83.  I say “other” 
voters since manyalbeit not allpotential donors are likely to be voters in the candidate’s 
jurisdiction. 
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policymaking activities that are at the heart of their public 
responsibilities.188  Yet, this argument, too, is vulnerable to the rebuttal that 
the real time diversion for officeholders is not fundraising but the 
campaigning of which fundraising is just a part.  In other words, it is the 
electoral process itself, or, more accurately, the need to run for reelection in 
order to continue to hold office that diverts an elected official’s time from 
the substantive responsibilities of office.  It is unclear whether fundraising 
takes up more of officials’ time than conferring with influential local party 
and civic leaders, attending the events of economic, social, ideological and 
media organizations, or meeting and greeting constituents throughout their 
terms of office as part of the permanent reelection campaign.  Yet, surely 
the democratic accountability provided by the need to seek reelection is a 
fundamental value of our system, not a problem.189  To the extent that the 
time devoted to campaigning does interfere with good government, there 
may be less restrictive solutions than an expenditure cap, such as limiting 
campaigning while the legislature is in session or limiting the number of 
terms an official may serve, thus eliminating the distraction of a reelection 
campaign from the final term.190
Of course, it could be argued that seeking media, interest group, or 
opinion leader endorsements, meeting with economic and social 
constituencies, and frequent interchanges with the voters is a more 
desirable form of campaigning than fundraising since fundraising focuses 
public officials’ time on large donors while other forms of campaigning 
address the mass of constituents or the groups that represent their interests.  
But that counterargument is really a return to the candidate time-protection 
argument which, as I have suggested, seems less than compelling. 
  More troubling, to the extent that it is 
difficult to distinguish the time burdens of fundraising from the time 
burdens of campaigning, the time-protection argument may be seen as 
implicitly suggesting a skeptical view of the value of elections themselves. 
To be sure, the time-protection argument has emerged as a powerful one 
for scholars and judges alike.  It has drawn the respectful attention of 
Justice Kennedy, who has otherwise been generally hostile to campaign 
 
 188. See Blasi, supra note 104, at 1282-83 (explaining that fundraising efforts detract 
from both the quantity and the quality of time a candidate can spend on “information 
gathering, political and policy analysis, and debating and compromising with fellow 
representatives”). 
 189. See id. at 1283 n.7 (explaining that constituents are “most actively engaged in 
expressing their complaints and preferences” during elections). 
 190. I do not advocate either of these measures, or address the constitutional issues raised 
by the first,, but merely use them to indicate that there may be other effectuve means of 
addressing the time burden problem without limiting campaign speech. 
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finance regulation,191 and individual members of the Sixth and Tenth 
Circuit panels,192 as well as the Landell majority.193
One aspect of the time-protection concern, however, may point the 
way to a more powerful justification for spending limits. There is 
considerable anecdotal evidence that the rigors of fund-raising have 
contributed to the decisions of some elected officials to decline to 
seek reelection, and, more importantly, have discouraged some 
potential candidates from even participating in the electoral 
process.
  It accurately captures 
the sense that the need to raise funds to match an opponent up to an 
unlimited maximum can take an enormous amount of elected officials’ 
time and distract them from the business of government.  Yet it is not clear 
whether candidate and officeholder time-protection constitutes a 
compelling justification for limiting candidate spending. 
194
C. Competitive Elections 
  The burdensome fund-raising process, thus, can operate 
to deny voters the opportunity to consider potentially attractive 
candidates, while reducing the scope and intensity of electoral 
competition. The costs of the current fund-raising system, which is 
driven by unlimited spending, thus, point to a significant justification 
for spending limits—the compelling governmental interest in 
promoting competitive elections. 
As the Association of the Bar of the City of New York has explained, 
“[e]lections are about giving voters choices.”195  A fair election allows 
voters to choose among a number of contenders for the same position, and 
also allows the candidates to compete for votes.196
 
 191. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 409 (2000) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
  It is particularly 
important that voters, when faced with an incumbent seeking reelection, be 
able to consider challengers.  The opportunity to deny reelection to 
incumbents, and the possibility that in any given election the people may 
exercise their authority to vote out current officeholders, is the ultimate 
security of popular control over government.  As Joseph Schumpeter once 
observed, “electorates normally do not control their political leaders in any 
 192. See supra Part I.B. 
 193. See Landell, 382 F.3d at 119-24. 
 194. See Blasi, supra note 104, at 1293. 
 195. ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., DOLLARS AND DEMOCRACY: A BLUEPRINT 
FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 91 (2000) [hereinafter DOLLARS AND DEMOCRACY]. 
 196. See id. 
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way except by refusing to reelect them.”197
Incumbents typically start out in an election with many built-in 
advantages ranging from the free media attention they have received while 
in office to the opportunity to use their offices to provide constituency 
service and bring pork barrel expenditures back to their districts.  These 
advantages contribute to, and are typically reinforced by, an incumbent’s 
superior fundraising prowess.
 
198  Interest groups and individuals interested 
in having access to officeholders are more likely to give to incumbents 
because incumbents are more likely to win, thus making their prediction of 
incumbent reelection more likely to come true.199  Incumbents tend to 
heavily outspend challengers, much as winners generally outspend losers 
by substantial margins.200  Moreover, an incumbent’s substantial financial 
superiority may discourage potential challengers from entering a race 
altogether.201
Potentially unlimited campaign spending aggravates this burden on 
competitiveness.  By enabling incumbentsand personally wealthy 
political newcomersto spend all the money they can raise, the lack of a 
spending limit increases the ability of an incumbent or wealthy candidate to 
financially outdistance opponents and also increases the amount of money 
necessary to fund a competitive race. Landell’s repeated references to 
candidates’ “‘pervasive war chests’” and the “‘arms race’ mentality”
  In effect, the incumbent’s financial edge constitutes a form 
of barrier to entry that reduces the competitiveness of our electoral system. 
202 
underscore this point, even if the Second Circuit’s focus was on the amount 
of time it takes a candidate to build a war chest rather than the impact of a 
large war chest and the prospect of an unending arms race in scaring off 
challengers and narrowing voters’ options.203
 
 197. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 272 (3d ed. 
1950). 
  Unlimited spending can 
reduce electoral competitiveness, particularly the likelihood voters will 
 198. DOLLARS AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 195, at 91-92 (noting that “the statistical 
likelihood that the incumbent will be reelected increases his or her ability to collect funds 
from donors who want access to the winner.”). 
 199. See id. at 92. 
 200. See generally id. at 65 (citing Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for 
Economic Development, Investing in the People’s Business: A Business Proposal for 
Campaign Finance Reform, at 17, 67 (1999)). 
 201. See Blasi, supra note 104, at 1293 (noting that challengers are deterred by the 
“formidable war chests” incumbents can acquire by accumulating PAC contributions). 
 202. See, e.g., Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d, 91, 121 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Blasi, supra 
note 104, at 1287), 122 (quoting Vermont Lieutenant Governor Smith), 123 (describing the 
testimony of public officials about an “arms race” mentality), 127 (referring to evidence at 
trial and legislative hearings indicating a “widespread” arms race mentality). 
 203. See, e.g., DOLLARS AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 195, at 60, 74. 
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hear from, and be able to choose among, candidates who are neither 
personally wealthy nor favored by wealthy backers.  By discouraging such 
candidates from running, unlimited spending, rather than protecting speech,  
may actually reduce both the amount and the diversity of electoral speech 
that voters hear. 
To be sure, a low spending limit can be anti-competitive.  Indeed, there 
is evidence that being able to achieve a critical level of spending is 
essential for a challenger to be effective.204  An unreasonably low spending 
limit can make it impossible for a challenger to get her name and message 
out to the voters.  But reasonable spending limits would have little effect on 
most challengers’ spending and would primarily serve to limit the ability of 
incumbents to wildly outdistance their challengers.205  Reasonable 
spending limits could reassure challengers that the funds they are able to 
raise will enable them to finance a race that is competitive with that of the 
incumbent.  So, too, such limits could cap the built-in advantages of 
personally wealthy, self-funding candidates.  With the knowledge that they 
would not be dramatically outspent by incumbents or personally wealthy 
candidates and that even limited fundraising success might be enough to 
make them competitive, more candidates could be encouraged to enter 
races.  Thus, reasonable spending limits would advance the interest in 
competitive electionsan interest that is constitutionally compelling 
because electoral competitiveness is essential to the public accountability 
that elections are intended to promote.206
Nor is there a less restrictive means of addressing the anti-competitive 
effects of incumbent war chests and the daunting advantages of well-
funded candidates than restricting the level of spending that candidates can 
undertake.  Public funding can enable a less well-funded candidate to get to 
a basic state-determined financial floor, and so promote competitiveness.  
But public funding can do nothing to limit well-funded candidates who do 
not take public funding from amassing war chests that give them a huge 
financial advantage and may even drive their opponents from the field. 
 
Buckley did not directly consider the competitiveness argument for 
spending limits, and neither did Landell.207
 
 204. See generally GARY C. JACOBSON, MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (1980). 
 Should the case come before 
 205. See ROBERT K. GOIDEL ET AL., MONEY MATTERS: CONSEQUENCES OF CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE REFORM IN U.S. HOUSE ELECTIONS 72 (1995). . 
 206. As with the prevention of corruption and the protection of officeholder time, 
competitive elections could also be effectively promoted with public funding. As with the 
other two goals, however, spending limits and public funding should be seen not as mutually 
exclusive, but as mutually reinforcing. 
207. Lucero, writing for the Tenth Circuit panel in Homans III, noted that the state 
interested in promoting electoral competition is an “interest distinct from” the justifications 
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the Supreme Court—or first return to the Second Circuit after a decision by 
the district court on remand—the ability of spending limits to promote 
competitive elections ought to be considered in determining whether 
spending limits pass constitutional muster. 
D. Voter Equality 
The final interest worth considering in the debate over spending limits is 
equality.  Equality is a central premise of our democratic system.  Over the 
course of our history, the electorate has been expanded to include nearly all 
adult citizens.  The one person, one vote doctrine208 has sought to ensure 
not simply that each adult citizen has a right to vote but that each voter has 
an equally weighted vote, and thus an equal opportunity to affect the 
outcome of the election.  Moreover, our laws most emphatically deny a 
special place for wealth in voting or running for office.209  Most states long 
ago scrapped wealth or tax-payment requirements for voting, and the 
Supreme Court has mandated the elimination of wealth-based requirements 
for voting or running for office.210
The interest in voter equality is not directly implicated by unlimited 
candidate spending.  As Buckley explained, with limits on the size of 
campaign contributions, differences in resources will simply reflect 
differences in the size and intensity of support for candidates “and there is 
nothing invidious, improper, or unhealthy” in that.
  The role of voter equality in our 
electoral system has implications beyond the actual casting and counting of 
ballots.  For an election to serve as a mechanism of democratic decision-
making there must be a considerable amount of election-related activity 
before balloting can occur.  Candidates, parties, interest groups, and 
interested individuals need to be able to attempt to persuade voters how to 
cast their ballots.  The election campaign is an integral part of the process 
of structured choice and democratic deliberation that constitutes an 
election. 
211
 
considered in Buckley and might be constitutionally compelling.  366 F.3d at 913; see supra 
note 69.  
  In other words, 
equalizing the financial participation of voters in the election could very 
well lead to differences in candidate spending if more voters give their 
 208. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-68 (1964). 
 209. See Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); 
Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
 210. See, e.g., Hill, 421 U.S. at 300-01 (invalidating requirement of separate approvals of 
voters and taxpayers as precondition for bond issue); Bullock, 405 U.S. at 149 (invalidating 
filing fee); Harper, 383 U.S. at 666 (holding poll tax unconstitutional). 
 211. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 56 (1976). 
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contributions to one candidate than another.  Nevertheless, the voter 
equality concern can support one aspect of candidate spending limits that 
would not be effectively supported by the anti-corruption and time-
protection concernsthe ability of personally wealthy candidates to use 
their own funds. 
In a footnote, Buckley acknowledged that its assumption that candidate 
resources would reflect the size and intensity of a candidate’s support—
and, thus, not threaten voter equality“may not apply where the candidate 
devotes a large amount of his personal resources to his campaign.”212  But 
wealthy, self-funded candidates are significant players in our politics, and 
their large and growing role is due in significant part to Buckley’s 
combination of contribution limits and unlimited spending.213  These 
candidates are uniquely well-positioned to spend money unconstrained by 
the effects of contribution limits, and their resources have nothing to do 
with the amount of public support for their campaigns.  Democratic 
equality is sorely challenged when a candidate can use her personal wealth, 
which reflects neither the size nor the intensity of her popular support, to 
become a major contender.  Neither the anti-corruption nor time-
preservation concerns supports the imposition of limits on self-funded 
candidates since these candidates are not dependent on donors and need not 
waste their time gathering funds.  It is not clear whether the spending of 
wealthy candidates can be limited solely in order to eliminate the 
corruption and time-burden problems faced by their opponents.  Nor is it 
clear if the electoral competitiveness concern supports limits on the 
spending of wealthy self-funded candidates since often, due to the 
interaction of contribution limits and unlimited spending, wealthy self-
funded candidates are the individuals in the best position to challenge 
incumbents.214
In addition, only the interest in voter equality could support limits on the 
spending of noncandidates, such as independent committees, that may 
undertake expenditures in support of or opposition to candidates.  To be 
sure, the Vermont spending limits apply only to candidates and related 
expenditures undertaken by committees, interest groups, or individuals in 
support of a candidate,
  Only the interest in voter equality provides a sufficient 
basis for limiting spending by self-funded candidates. 
215
 
 212. Id. at 56 n.63. 
 so there was no need in Landell to develop a 
spending limit justification that extends to independent committees.  Yet, 
ultimately, the success of candidate spending limits may turn on a state’s 
 213. DOLLARS AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 195, at 73-74. 
 214. Id. at 74. 
 215. Vermont Campaign Finance Act of 1997, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2805. 
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ability to impose reasonable limits on spending by outside groups.  If 
spending by candidates is limited, interest groups and politically engaged 
individuals may shift their campaign funds from donations to candidates to 
independent spending.  Although independent groups have an important 
role to play in presenting facts, ideas, and arguments to the voters, they do 
not speak for candidates, they do not stand for election, and they are not 
accountable to the electorate.  The threat of unlimited one-sided spending 
can create the same disincentive to candidate entry as one-sided candidate 
spending.  So, too, independent spending by wealthy individuals or well-
funded committees could win the gratitude of, and access to, the elected 
officials who benefit from such spending, even if that spending is not 
technically coordinated with the candidate.  Buckley rejected this 
proposition, but it is uncertain whether the Court’s quasi-empirical hunch 
about the limited gratitude likely to result from uncoordinated independent 
spending is right.  More pragmatically, some jurisdictions will be reluctant 
to enact candidate spending limits so long as unlimited spending by 
wealthy individuals and interest groups is possible.  And only the interest in 
democratic equality can provide a compelling justification for independent 
spending limits. 
Buckley emphatically and famously rejected the idea that equality can 
justify limitations on campaign communications.216  But in Austin the Court 
engaged in reasoning that closely tracked the voter equality argument when 
it upheld the prohibition on corporate campaign expenditures.  As Austin 
explained, corporate campaign spending can “unfairly influence elections” 
because a corporation’s campaign funds have “little or no correlation to the 
public’s support for [its] ideas.”217  In other words, spending that reflects 
the corporate spender’s wealth rather than the extent of popular support for 
its message gives the corporate spending an undue influence over the 
electoral outcome.  That is the voter equality argument exactly.  More 
recently, Justice Breyer, concurring with Justice Ginsburg in Shrink 
Missouri, pointed out that “the Constitution tolerates . . . limiting the 
political rights of some so as to make effective the political rights of the 
entire electorate.”218  Thus, Buckley’s rejection of equality concerns is itself 
in deep tension with equality concerns voiced elsewhere both by individual 
members of the Court and by the Court as a whole.219
 
 216. 424 U.S. at 48-49. 
 
 217. 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990). 
 218. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 219. Although Buckley ruled out limits on independent spending, the Supreme Court of 
Canada recently upheld the limits imposed by the Canada Elections Act of 2000 on 
independent spending by individuals and groups in Canadian elections. See Harper v. 
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As Judge Calabresi nicely put it, inequality is surely the unspoken but 
“huge elephant—and donkey—in the living room in all discussions of 
campaign finance reform.”220
E. Democratic Elections 
  The amelioration of the political 
consequences of wealth inequalities is surely one of the driving forces 
behind campaign finance reform. That concern should be taken directly 
into account in judicial consideration of spending limits. 
It is not clear whether any one of the arguments presented in this Part by 
itself would be sufficient to sustain candidate spending limits from 
constitutional challenge.  The anti-corruption argument may be of 
compelling importance but there are arguably less restrictive means of 
addressing that concern, and the significance of elected official time-
protection in a political environment in which elections take a considerable 
amount of time is debatable. To the extent that time-protection is 
fundamentally a concern about the consequences of the extensive 
fundraising that the current regime of limited contributions and unlimited 
spending requires, the ability of spending limits to alleviate the rigors of 
fundraising may advance the interest in electoral competition. Indeed, 
spending limits directly promote electoral competitiveness by limiting the 
ability of one candidate to financially overwhelm his or her opponents, but 
no court has yet determined that promoting competitiveness is a compelling 
concern.221
 
Canada (Att’y Gen.), [2004] S.C.R. 827.  Judge Calabresi made equality concerns central to 
his concurrence in the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc in Landell. As he 
explained, equality is one of the “two principal values at play in the campaign finance 
debate”—the other value, of course, being freedom of political expression. Landell v. 
Sorrell, 2005 WL 826151, at *1. Indeed, Judge Calabresi found equality concerns embedded 
in the First Amendment. As he explained, Buckley’s invalidation of spending limits enabled 
individuals to “express the intensity of their political feelings . . . through money.” Id.  But, 
due to the “unequal distribution of wealth, money does not measure intensity of desire 
equally for rich and poor.” Id.  In his view, the Vermont spending limits may have been 
intended to create “something of an ‘equal’ opportunity to express intensity of political 
desire” and to use limits “to make sure that that intensity is not measured differently for rich 
and for poor.”  See id. 
  Although protecting voter equality ought to be a basic 
principle of campaign finance regulation, the relevance of voter equality to 
candidate spending limits, other than limits on self-funded candidates, is 
uncertain, and Buckley sharply rejected the idea that equality concerns 
could be used to limit campaign speech.  Ultimately the case for candidate 
spending limits may require putting all these arguments together. 
 220. Landell, 2005 WL 826151, at *1. 
221. But cf., Homans III, 366 F.3d at 913 (suggesting that electoral competitiveness could 
be a compelling interest justifying spending limits). 
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Landell suggests a framework for aggregating arguments that might be 
inadequate when considered separately but powerful when taken together.  
As the Second Circuit explained, the anti-corruption and time-protection 
interests “overlap and might be better described as one interest‘to protect 
the integrity of the electoral processthe means through which a free 
society democratically translates political speech into concrete 
governmental action.’”222
The fundamental components of democratic elections are not limited to 
the prevention of corruption and the protection of officeholder time.  
Rather, they include the democratic values of electoral competition and the 
recognition of voter equality.  To be sure, democratic values can also be 
threatened by spending limits.  Limits can curtail the communications of 
the spenders.  By limiting such communication, they can limit the 
information received by the voters.  So, too, limits on candidate spending 
can make it harder for candidates to engage voters in the electoral process 
and mobilize them to come to the polls.  In short, from a democratic 
perspective, spending limits have costs as well as benefits.  The assessment 
of spending limits in light of the elements of democratic elections is, thus, a 
complex one, and certainly more complex than the exclusive focus on the 
potential for corruption and the appearance of corruption taken by Buckley.  
But surely the rules governing campaign finance should be informed by an 
awareness of the complex needs of electoral democracy. 
  That, indeed, should be the test.  Does unlimited 
spending undermine democratic elections, and are spending limits narrowly 
tailored to advance the compelling interest in democratic elections? 
CONCLUSION 
The ultimate fate of the Vermont spending limits upheld by Landell is 
uncertain.  The Supreme Court could agree to take the case prior to action 
by the district court on remand.223
 
 222. Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 124 n.18 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Nixon, 528 U.S. at 
401 (Breyer, J., concurring)). 
  The district court on remand, or the 
Second Circuit on appeal from the district court’s remand decision, could 
conclude that, given the possibility of public funding for candidates, 
spending limits are not the least restrictive means of advancing the 
compelling interests the court found.  The district court or the Second 
Circuit could agree with Judge Winter that the specific spending limits 
adopted in 1997—which do not include a cost-of-living adjustment, make 
 223. A petition for certiorari was filed on May 12, 2005 on behalf of the Vermont 
Republican State Committee, the Vermont Right to Life Committee, Inc,, and other 
petitioners.  See Vt. Republican State Comm. v. Sorrell, No. 04-1530, available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/04-1530.htm. 
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no provision for the costs of compliance with the campaign spending law, 
and count related expenditures of third parties not simply as contributions 
to candidates but as candidate expenditures, thereby eating into the 
expenditures allowed by candidateshave become too low to permit 
effective advocacy and are thus unconstitutional even if spending limits are 
theoretically permissible.  Or, of course, the  district court and the Second 
Circuit could find that the limits are constitutional.  At that point the case 
would almost certainly go to the Supreme Court. 
Whatever the next step, Landell will have played an important role in 
reopening the spending limits question.  The three decades of Buckley have 
created a campaign finance regime that, in its combination of limited 
contributions and unlimited campaign expenditures, is inherently unstable. 
Candidates and donors alike are driven to create and exploit whatever 
loopholes they can find.  Moreover, Buckley’s exclusive focus on 
corruption misses many of the larger issues at stake in the financing of 
election campaigns.  Landell itself expands the range of judicial concern 
somewhat by adding the impact of bundling and the value of time 
protection, even if it failed to address such other critical factors as the 
implications for competitive elections and the value of voter equality.  But 
in challenging even a piece of Buckley, Landell may have set in motion a 
process of judicial reconsideration not only of Buckley’s specific holding 
concerning spending limits but of Buckley’s broader framework for 
thinking about the constitutionality of campaign finance law. 
 
